




- 1. Compromised daemons/root applications
  - No limit to configuration changes
- 2. Dubious installers
  - Sony DRM, Kazaa



- 1. User knows when they want to install something
- 2. Explicitly grants superuser privileges
  - Can run arbitrary code
  - Can overwrite arbitrary files
- 3. Source of installer is downloaded code?
  - The complete opposite of what we're trying to tell them




- 1. Information Flow
  - Read and write to data files
  - Only read from configuration-related files
- 2. Application Includes Installers
- 3. Regardless of whether the program is run as root
- 4. Example of Data file:
  - Your pictures of Montreal




- 1. Assumption is the system is in a steady state
  - No new applications being installed/removed
- 2. Need very-high privileges to install/upgrade
  - Read-only media needs to be made writable
  - Tripwire needs manual merging of changes
- 3. My Observations
  - All handle installs, but were not designed for it.
  - Even MAC systems don't directly tackle the problem of how you get new/updated software onto the system.




- 1. Manual Install:
  - Thick book of instructions
  - No installer run with superuser privileges
- 2. Application bundles:
  - Linux package managers still run scripts with root
  - Apple bundles don't know about scripts
- 3. Tracking Changes:
  - System Checkpointing, Sandboxing
  - User must run tools before install




- 1. What is an installer
  - Hard question
  - Prone to subversion by malware
- 2. Different installers need to do different things
  - Security Updates change little
  - OS Upgrades change much
- 3. Any attempt to subclass the installer space?
  - Apparently not
- 4. Not sure we need to classify installers
  - Configuration privilege still a contribution without classification




- 1. From Previous: Identifying what is an installer is hard
- 2. Alternative install approaches (manual, packages, tracking) required identifying installers
- 3. Non-installers should not be allowed to configure the system
- 4. Want to limit dangerous configuration operations regardless




- 1. Privilege required to modify system configurationFiles on disk
- 2. Identify configuration changes and limit them
- 3. Privilege required to modify configuration files on a system




- 1. Kernel enforcement limits choices
  - Rootkit-resistant disks
  - Code-signing
- 2. Configd
  - A daemon which responds to configuration requests
- 3. User-input is intentionally broad
  - Traditional Keyboard/Display
  - USB Keys
  - Location Sensor
  - Biometrics




- 1. Problem:
  - Developers pop up a dialogue box
  - Users follow the instructions
  - We've just shifted the problem.
- 2. Not sufficient to just create the privilege
  - Must specify how the privilege is used
- 3. Restrict in a way that developers can't convince the naive user to run with elevated privileges.




- 1. Reduce the effectiveness of social engineering
- 2. A single system daemon
  - Make it hard to get around




- 1. The collection of parts in a drill
  - More useful than the drill, but harder to use
- 2. Going past determining all the pieces we need
- 3. Involves determining how the pieces work together
- 4. Decrease the complexity exposed to the user




- 1. Installers can by pass most frameworks by talking directly to the OS kernel
  - Including all frameworks I'm aware of
- 2. OS does not restrict activities
  - Installer is run as superuser




- 1. Applies to all applications
- 2. Interface with OS kernel is limited
- 3. Configd can reject requests for configuration changes



- 1. Each Module:
  - Examines elements of system state
  - Rejects, Allows, or Postpones making a decision
- 2. Base Configd also responds to system events
- 3. Rejected requests do not not modify file-system state
- 4. Modules work together
  - e.g., Code-signing combined with Rootkit-resistant disks
- 5. Mix of modules is not right yet.
- 6. Experimenting with asking the user
- 7. Extensible to try out new ideas
  - Module list is not designed to be modifed at runtime



- 1. Kernel:
  - Prevents others from getting configure permission
  - Protects the configd process
  - Protects configuration-related files
- 2. Configd:
  - Deals with requests for configuration changes
  - Notifies the kernel what files are configuration related
- 3. Prevent race conditions by suspending other tasks



- 1. Done:
  - Configd framework and modified Linux kernel
- 2. In progress:
  - Integrating **configd** into a Debian system
  - Start to determine what the right mix of modules should be

Questions	5		
	Glenn Wurster, Paul C. van Oorschot	System Config Privilege	19/19