

Dynamics of Resource Sharing in Networks

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Outline

- Fairness in networks
- Rate control in communication networks
(relatively well understood)
- Ramp metering (early models)
- Energy networks (preliminary remarks)


Network structure

J - set of resources

R - set of routes


$A_{jr} = 1$ - if resource j is on route r

$A_{jr} = 0$ - otherwise



Notation

- J - set of resources
- R - set of users, or routes
- $j \in r$ - resource j is on route r
- x_r - flow rate on route r
- $U_r(x_r)$ - utility to user r
- C_j - capacity of resource j
- $Ax \leq C$ - capacity constraints



The system problem

SYSTEM(U, A, C): *Maximize* $\sum_{r \in R} U_r(x_r)$
subject to $Ax \leq C$
over $x \geq 0$

Maximize aggregate utility,
subject to capacity constraints

The user problem

$$\mathbf{USER}_r(U_r; \lambda_r): \quad \textit{Maximize} \quad U_r \left(\frac{w_r}{\lambda_r} \right) - w_r$$
$$\textit{over} \quad w_r \geq 0$$

User r chooses
an amount to pay per unit time, w_r ,
and receives in return a flow $x_r = w_r / \lambda_r$

The network problem

NETWORK($A, C; w$): *Maximize* $\sum_{r \in R} w_r \log x_r$
subject to $Ax \leq C$
over $x \geq 0$

As if the network maximizes a logarithmic utility function, but with constants $\{w_r\}$ chosen by the users

Problem decomposition

Theorem: the system problem
may be solved
by solving simultaneously
the network problem and
the user problems

K 1997,
Johari, Tsitsiklis 2005,
Yang, Hajek 2006

Max-min fairness

Rates $\{x_r\}$ are *max-min fair* if they are feasible:

$$x \geq 0, \quad Ax \leq C$$

and if, for any other feasible rates $\{y_r\}$,

$$\exists r : y_r > x_r \implies \exists s : y_s < x_s < x_r$$

Rawls 1971,
Bertsekas, Gallager 1987

Proportional fairness

Rates $\{x_r\}$ are *proportionally fair* if they are feasible:

$$x \geq 0, Ax \leq C$$

and if, for any other feasible rates $\{y_r\}$, the aggregate of proportional changes is negative:

$$\sum_{r \in R} \frac{y_r - x_r}{x_r} \leq 0$$

Weighted proportional fairness

A feasible set of rates $\{x_r\}$ are such that
are *weighted proportionally fair*
if, for any other feasible rates $\{y_r\}$,

$$\sum_{r \in R} w_r \frac{y_r - x_r}{x_r} \leq 0$$

Fairness and the network problem

Theorem: a set of rates $\{x_r\}$
solves the network problem,
NETWORK(A,C;w),
if and only if the rates are
weighted proportionally fair

Bargaining problem (Nash, 1950)

Solution to **NETWORK**($A, C; \mathbf{w}$) with $\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{1}$ is unique point satisfying

- Pareto efficiency
- Symmetry
- Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives

(General \mathbf{w} corresponds to a model with unequal bargaining power)

Market clearing equilibrium (Gale, 1960)

Find prices \mathbf{p} and an allocation \mathbf{x} such that


$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{p} \geq 0, \quad \mathbf{Ax} \leq \mathbf{C} & \quad \text{(feasibility)} \\ \mathbf{p}^T (\mathbf{C} - \mathbf{Ax}) = 0 & \quad \text{(complementary slackness)} \\ w_r = x_r \sum_{j \in r} p_j, \quad r \in R & \quad \text{(endowments spent)} \end{aligned}$$

Solution solves **NETWORK**($\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{C}; \mathbf{w}$)

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End-to-end congestion control




Senders learn (through feedback from receivers) of congestion at queue, and slow down or speed up accordingly. With current TCP, throughput of a flow is proportional to

$$1/(T \sqrt{p})$$

T = round-trip time, p = packet drop probability.

(Jacobson 1988, Mathis, Semke, Mahdavi, Ott 1997, Padhye, Firoiu, Towsley, Kurose 1998, Floyd & Fall 1999)

Network structure



J - set of resources

R - set of routes

$j \in r$ - resource j is on route r

$x_r(t)$ - flow rate on route r at time t

$\mu_j(t)$ - rate of congestion indication,
at resource j at time t

A primal algorithm

$$\frac{d}{dt} x_r(t) = \kappa_r(x_r(t)) \left(w_r - x_r(t) \sum_{j \in r} \mu_j(t) \right)$$

$$\mu_j(t) = p_j \left(\sum_{s: j \in s} x_s(t) \right)$$

$x_r(t)$ - rate changes by linear increase,
multiplicative decrease

$p_j(\cdot)$ - proportion of packets marked as a
function of flow through resource

Global stability

Theorem: the above dynamical system has a stable point to which all trajectories converge. The stable point is proportionally fair with respect to the weights $\{w_r\}$, and solves the network problem, when

$$\begin{aligned} p_j(x) &= 0 & x \leq C_j \\ &= \infty & x > C_j \end{aligned}$$

General TCP-like algorithm

Source maintains window of sent, but not yet acknowledged, packets - size $cwnd$

$$cwnd \approx xT$$

On route r ,

- $cwnd$ incremented by $a_r cwnd^n$ on positive acknowledgement
- $cwnd$ decremented by $b_r cwnd^m$ for each congestion indication ($m > n$)
- $a_r = 1, b_r = 1/2, m=1, n=-1$ corresponds to Jacobson's TCP


Differential equations with delays

$$\frac{d}{dt} x_r(t) = \frac{x_r(t - T_r)}{T_r}$$

$$\cdot \left(a_r (x_r(t) T_r)^n (1 - \lambda_r(t)) - b_r (x_r(t) T_r)^m \lambda_r(t) \right)$$

$$\lambda_r(t) = 1 - \prod_{j \in r} \left(1 - \mu_j(t - T_{jr}) \right)$$

$$\mu_j(t) = p_j \left(\sum_{r: j \in r} x_r(t - T_{rj}) \right)$$



Equilibrium point

$$x_r = \frac{1}{T_r} \left(\frac{a_r}{b_r} \frac{1 - \lambda_r}{\lambda_r} \right)^{1/m-n} \quad r \in R$$

- $a_r = 1, b_r = 1/2, m=1, n= -1$ corresponds to Jacobson's TCP, and recovers square root formula
- But what is the impact of delays on stability?
Can we choose m, n, \dots arbitrarily?

Delay stability

Johari, Tan 1999,
Massoulié 2000,
Vinnicombe 2000,
Paganini, Doyle, Low 2001

Equilibrium is locally stable if there exists a global constant β such that

$$x p'_j(x) < \beta p_j(x),$$

$$a_r (x_r T_r)^n < \frac{\pi}{2\beta}$$

condition on
sensitivity for
each resource j

condition on
aggressiveness
for each route r

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



FIGURE 1
 Speed vs. flow on I-10 westbound in 5 minute intervals from 4:00 am to 6:00 pm

[What we've learned about highway congestion](#)

P. Varaiya, Access 27, Fall 2005, 2-9.




[Data, modelling and inference in road traffic networks](#)

R.J. Gibbens and Y. Saatci
 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A366
 (2008), 1907-1919.

Figure 2. The relationship between the speed and flow of vehicles observed on the morning of Wednesday, 14 July 2004 using the M25 midway between junctions 11 and 12 in the clockwise direction. In the free-flow regime, flow rapidly increases with only a modest decline in speeds. Above a critical occupancy of vehicles there is a marked drop in speed with little, if any, improvement in flow which is then followed by a severe collapse into a congested regime where both flow and speed are highly variable and attain very low levels. Finally, the situation recovers with a return to higher flows and an improvement in speeds

A linear network



$$m_i(t) = m_i(0) + e_i(t) - \int_0^t \Lambda_i(m(s)) ds, \quad t \geq 0$$

queue
size

cumulative
inflow

metering
rate

Metering policy

Suppose the metering rates can be chosen to be any vector $\Lambda = \Lambda(m)$ satisfying

$$\sum_i A_{ji} \Lambda_i \leq C_j, \quad j \in J$$

$$\Lambda_i \geq 0, \quad i \in I$$

$$\Lambda_i = 0, \quad m_i = 0$$

and such that

$$m_i(t) = m_i(0) + e_i(t) - \int_0^t \Lambda_i(m(s)) ds \geq 0, \quad t \geq 0$$

Optimal policy?

For each of $i = I, I-1, \dots, 1$ in turn choose

$$\int_0^t \Lambda_i(m(s)) ds \geq 0$$

to be maximal, subject to the constraints.

This policy minimizes

$$\sum_i m_i(t)$$

for all times t

Proportionally fair metering

Suppose $\Lambda(m) = (\Lambda_i(m), i \in I)$ is chosen to

maximize
$$\sum_i m_i \log \Lambda_i$$

subject to
$$\sum_i A_{ji} \Lambda_i \leq C_j, \quad j \in J$$

$$\Lambda_i \geq 0, \quad i \in I$$

$$\Lambda_i = 0, \quad m_i = 0$$

Proportionally fair metering

$$\Lambda_i(m) = \frac{m_i}{\sum_j p_j A_{ji}}, \quad i \in I$$

where

$$\Lambda_i \geq 0, \quad i \in I$$

$$\sum_i A_{ji} \Lambda_i \leq C_j, \quad j \in J$$

$$p_j \geq 0, \quad j \in J$$

$$p_j \left(C_j - \sum_i A_{ji} \Lambda_i \right) \geq 0, \quad j \in J$$


KKT
conditions

p_j - *shadow price* (Lagrange multiplier) for the resource j capacity constraint

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
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Dynamic demand



Use system frequency as a signal to control domestic loads, particularly refrigerators and freezers, to provide operating reserve

Distribution of frequency



From: www.dynamicDemand.co.uk
(Dynamic Demand is a not-for-profit organisation set up by a grant from the Esmée Fairbairn Foundation)

Figure 5: Distribution of grid frequency for a 30 hour period starting 31/08/2005 18:54:00. The mean frequency was slightly lower than nominal.

Simulation of system frequency after a 1320MW loss of generation

1320MW of Dynamic Demand Control refrigeration (black) compared with 1320MW spinning reserve (grey)
(Total demand = 36GW, DDC constant = 0.2Hz/°C)


dynamicDemand

grid stability through demand control


Simulation output by Joe Short

Tel: 07967 481693


joe.short@dynamicdemand.co.uk




Hybrid reserve service




Typical wind turbine power curve




Recorded wind load factors 2008



Persistence errors in forecasting wind



Matching vehicle charging to the current electricity demand profile



British Electricity Transmission System



The Transmission System broadly comprises all circuits operating at 400kV and 275kV. In Scotland transmission also includes 132kV networks.

The Transmission System is connected via interconnectors to transmission systems in France and Northern Ireland.

