

# Stable Marriages

## Source

Kleinberg + Tardos  
↳ ALGORITHM  
DESIGN

by

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# STABLE MARRIAGES

$n$ -men:  $m_1, m_2, \dots, m_n$

$n$ -women:  $w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n$

preference list for each man/woman

INPUT

$n$ -marriages:  $(m_{i_1}, w_{j_1}) \dots (m_{i_n}, w_{j_n})$

such that they are stable.

OUTPUT

STABLE MARRIAGE: IF THERE ~~IS~~ a pair

$(m, w)$  such that

(a)  $m$  likes  $w$  better than his current partner.

(b)  $w$  likes  $m$  better than her current partner.

PROBLEM: GIVEN INPUT  $\rightarrow$  PRODUCE OUTPUT.


$m_2$	$m_3$	$m_1$	$m_5$	$m_4$
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$m_5$	$m_1$	$m_2$	$m_3$	$m_4$
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

$m_4$	$m_2$	$m_1$	$m_3$	$m_5$
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

$m_5$	$m_4$	$m_3$	$m_2$	$m_1$
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

$m_1$	$m_3$	$m_2$	$m_4$	$m_5$
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------



$w_1$	$w_4$	$w_3$	$w_5$	$w_2$
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

$w_5$	$w_2$	$w_3$	$w_4$	$w_1$
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

$w_3$	$w_4$	$w_5$	$w_2$	$w_1$
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

$w_4$	$w_3$	$w_2$	$w_5$	$w_1$
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

$w_4$	$w_3$	$w_5$	$w_1$	$w_2$
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Observe :

A. MATCHING ✓

B. STABLE ?


**CONSIDER PAIR  $(w_4, m_4)$**

→  $w_4$  prefers  $m_4$  over  $m_3$

→  $m_4$  prefers  $w_4$  over  $w_5$

⇒ **NOT STABLE**

# STABLE MARRIAGES ARE NOT UNIQUE



- I: PAIRS  $(m, w)$  and  $(m', w')$  are stable
- II: PAIRS  $(m, w')$  and  $(m', w)$  are stable

## PROBLEM :

Find a set of Marriages such that

→ Every Woman  $w_i$  is married.

→ Every Man  $m_i$  is married.

→ ALL MARRIAGES are **STABLE**.

# PROPOSAL ALGORITHM

While  $\exists$  an unmarried man who has not proposed to all women do

1.  $m$  chooses his favourite woman  $w$  who he has not proposed yet.
2.  $m$  proposes to  $w$
3. if  $w$  is not married or likes  $m$  better than her current partner  $m'$
4.  $w$  divorces  $m'$ .
5.  $w$  marries  $m$ .



Wow!

P1: Does there always  $\exists$  a set of n-stable marriages?

P2: Does this algorithm always terminate?

P3: Does it always produce correct result?

P4: How efficient is the algorithm?

**DESIGN**  $\leftrightarrow$  Properties + Correctness.  
**ANALYSIS**  $\leftrightarrow$  Resource Complexities  
**ALGORITHMS**

DAA

# Lemma 1: Termination

Proposal Algorithm terminates after at most  $n^2$  iterations.

- Proof:
1. There are  $n$ -men.
  2. Each man can propose to  $n$ -women.
  3. A man never proposes to the same woman twice.
  4. At most  $n^2$  proposals are made.
  5. In each iteration one proposal is made.

$\Rightarrow$  At most  $n^2$  iterations in all.





Lemma 2: When the proposal algorithm terminates every woman is married ( $\Rightarrow$  every man is married).


Proof: (by contradiction).

1. Assume  $\exists$  an unmarried woman  $w$  at termination of proposal algorithm.
2.  $\Rightarrow \exists$  an unmarried man  $m$ .
3. Once a woman gets married, she stays married, though the partners may change.
4. When algorithm terminates then  $m$  must have proposed to each woman, including  $w$ !
5.  $\Rightarrow w$  is married, either to  $m$  or somebody whom she ranks higher.



Lemma 3: All marriages computed by proposal algorithm are stable.

Proof: (by contradiction)




Let  $(w, m)$  and  $(w', m')$  be two marriages computed by the algorithm such that

- (a)  $w$  prefers  $m'$  over  $m$  ( $m <_w m'$ )  $\ominus$
- (b)  $m'$  prefers  $w$  over  $w'$ .  
(i.e. it's not stable)

Consider  $m'$ .


Since  $m'$  prefers  $w$  over  $w'$ ,  
 $m'$  would have proposed to  $w$  before  $w'$ .

$\Rightarrow$  Let  $m''$  be the man to whom  $w$  is married just after  $m'$  proposed.

Case A: If  $w$  accepts  $m'$ , then  $m'' = m'$ .  
 Case B: If  $w$  rejects  $m'$ , then  $m'' >_w m'$ .  
 $\Rightarrow m' \leq_w m''$  

Let  $m'' = m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k = m$  be the sequence of partners that  $w$  has since this time till the end of the algorithm.

[Notice that for any woman, only reason she switches the partner is because a higher preferred one proposed to her.]

$\Rightarrow m'' = m_1 <_w m_2 <_w m_3 <_w \dots <_w m_k = m$  — 

From assumption we have that  $w$  prefers  $m'$  over  $m$  (i.e.,  $m <_w m'$ )

Now we get  $m <_w m' \leq_w m'' = m_1 <_w m_2 <_w \dots <_w m_k = m$ .  
 I II III

$\Rightarrow m <_w m$  (Contradiction)



## TWO OBSERVATIONS

Let  $(m, \text{best}(m))$  denote a pair in stable matching for  $m$  such that no woman who  $m$  prefers more than  $\text{best}(m)$  forms a stable matching with  $m$ .

In proposal algorithm, there is a choice in terms of choosing "unmarried man".

**CLAIM:** Any execution of proposal algorithm produces  $(m, \text{best}(m))$  stable matching.

This also corresponds to  $(w, \text{worst}(w))$  stable-matching.

Nice problem to think about

Can one design an unbiased  
stable marriage algorithm.

—x—

Remaining Issues:

How to implement proposal algorithm?

→ Data Structures / Link Lists

→ Run Time

→ Space

$O(n^2)$