

An Approach for Establishing Trust in MANETs for Network Services



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- Mobility helps Security
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Security Challenges in MANETs


- Vulnerability of (wireless) Channels and Nodes
 - *Eavesdropping, Injecting fake messages*
 - *Lack of physical protection and strong access control*
- Lack of Dedicated Servers
 - *Naming Services, Certificate Authorities, Directories*
- Sophisticated Protocols, Hard to Secure
 - *Routing: Incorrect information or topology change?*
- Attacks on Routing and Data Traffic
 - *Attract or Avoid Traffic, Confusing others*
 - *Clogging Networks, Maliciously dropping packets, Manipulating user data*

Trust Issues in MANETs

- In the context of this work
 - Trusted Third Parties (Friends)*
 - Trusted (Authenticated) Security Associations*
- Security Protocols require **out-of-bound** Key Exchange (Security Association) between the nodes
- Absence of online Trust Infrastructure such as Certificate Authorities Hierarchy
- PGP, Threshold Cryptography, **Side Channel, Friends**


Mobility helps Security [Capk]

- Public Key Cryptography and verifiable Node Addresses




- *Secure Side Channel*

- *Short range, point-to-point connection*
- *Can be eavesdropped but not altered*






- *Friends*

- *Trust each other to provide correct info.*
- *Already established a security association*



Extending the Solution

- Beyond the range of side channel, and in absence of a common friend
- **But** Friend of one side can be in the vicinity of the other side
- **Even** Friend of one side can be in the vicinity of Friend of the other side



Performance Evaluation, Model

- $N=[n]$ nodes
- F friendship
- $E(t)=[e_{ij}(t)]$ SA at time t , $E(t_0)=F$
- $P=[p_{ij}]$ SA requests,
 - P_{ij} : user i wants to establish SA with user j
- *Convergence* $r(t)$; The fraction of required SA established at the time t

$$r(t) = \frac{\sum_{i,j}^n e_{ij}(t) \cdot p_{ij}}{\sum_{i,j}^n p_{ij}}$$

Performance Evaluation, Results

Random Waypoint Mobility Model, Simulated with MATLAB

10 Nodes

Friends Distrib. 0.1

RF Range 20 units

100x100 Area

Request Distrib. 0.2

SC Range 1 unit

Speed 1 unit/step


Timeout 30

Sleep Ratio %25

--- Side Channel/Friends

--- Friends/Neighbors




--- Friends/Friends



Speed x 4

Friends x 2

Requests x 4



Conclusion

- Two extensions by combining *SSC* and *Friends* mechanisms
- Resulted improvements verified by simulations
- Improvements more visible at lower speeds, higher densities of *Friends*, or higher request rates

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